Federal Exemption from Liens is No Simple Matter

Author: Corbin Devlin

With significant recent and ongoing expansion at the Calgary, Edmonton and Fort McMurray airports, a number of trades have been interested in the question whether airports are subject to builders’ liens. In the recent Alberta decision Park Avenue Flooring Inc. v. EllisDon Construction Services Inc., the judge states categorically that the Alberta Builders’ Lien Act has no application to the Calgary Airport because it is federal property. This is the first time a court has made such a clear pronouncement on this issue in Alberta.

The issue is canvassed more fully in the 2009 B.C. case Vancouver International Airport v. Lafarge Canada Inc.

Constitutional Questions
 
The issue is actually more complex than the decision in Park Avenue Flooring case might suggest. It is not every construction project relating to an airport that is exempt from provincial lien legislation. First, an interest in land owned by the federal government is clearly exempt. But... not all airport lands are owned by the federal government. Second, an operation or “undertaking” that is within the jurisdiction of the federal government may be exempt (whether or not the lands in question are owned by the federal government) based on constitutional principles. The federal government clearly has jurisdiction over aeronautics. But this doesn’t mean that airports are exempt from provincial legislation for all purposes and in all cases; various case-specific considerations might come into play, such as the degree of federal control over the operation or undertaking… and not all airports are subject to the same degree of federal control. Third, there may be multiple interests in land at an airport; i.e. the federal government, the airport authority, airlines, hotels, car rental agencies, concessions... Different considerations may come into play depending which interest in land is in issue; the cases referenced here do not resolve the question whether subsidiary interests (e.g. leases) in airport lands could sometimes be subject to liens at the same time other interests are exempt.

Airports
 
Although it would be easy to suggest that airports are categorically exempt from lien legislation based on the Park Avenue Flooring case, it would be a mistake to interpret the court’s comments in that case too broadly. It remains arguable that not all interest in airport lands are exempt from provincial lien legislation. But no doubt valid provincial lien rights at airports would very much be the exception.

Interpreting a "Withholding of Payments" Clause

Author: Corbin Devlin

A contract provision that permits an owner to withhold payment from a contractor is not a “penalty” clause.

Penalty Provisions
 
The courts do not like, and typically do not enforce, “penalty” clauses. For this reason, liquidated damages clauses in favour of the construction owner generally have to be based on a “genuine pre-estimate of damages” in order to avoid the court striking the liquidated damages clause down.

No Further Payment Provisions
 
In a recent Ontario case, Ottawa Community Housing Corp. V. Foustanellas, the contractor argued that a clause providing that (in certain instances of default) “the obligation of the Owner to make payments will cease” was a penalty clause, and therefore not legally enforceable. The contractor was overbilling the owner, and consequently the owner acted on a clause in the contract that permitted the owner to “take work out of the hands of the Contractor.” The owner then hired someone else to complete the work, but the Contractor sued to recover payment for the work it had performed before the owner took the work out of its hands.

Specifically, the contract permitted the owner, upon default by the contractor, to “take the whole operation, or any part of the operation out of the hands of the Contractor.” The owner relied upon that clause and a further clause stating:   “…where any or all of the work has been taken out of the hands of the Contractor, the Contractor will not be entitled to any further payment, including payments then due and payable but not yet paid. The obligation of the Owner to make payments will cease, and the Contractor will be liable upon demand to pay the Owner an amount equal to all of the losses and damages incurred by the Owner for the non-completion of the work.”

The court decided this last clause did not erase the debt due to the contractor (if any). It suspended payments due to the contractor (if any) until a final accounting could be done, after the owner had the work completed by others. Since the clause only suspended payments, and it did not erase the debt, it was not a penalty clause. It was enforceable.

Debts Owing vs. Payments Due
 
This is not a surprising outcome or new law. But it is useful case authority for the interpretation of a fairly common contract provision. It is also a reminder of the distinction between a debt owing and a payment due. This is a deceptively simple distinction that is essential to proper interpretation of construction contracts and lien legislation. I frequently see misinterpretations of contract and lien legislation due to misunderstandings on this point. In the Foustanellas case, it appears that the contractor went to trial on the misinterpretation that the default provisions in the contract erased the debt, whereas the proper interpretation was that the default provisions merely suspended the payment obligation.

The court called this “a ‘stop payment’ provision. It is designed to halt the owner’s contractual obligation to make any payments to the contractor pending determination of the owner’s losses and damages arising from the contractor’s breach of contract.” In Foustanellas, the debt was erased, but not because of a penalty clause. The debt to the contractor was erased because the owner’s increased cost to complete the work as a result of the contractor’s default exceeded the value earned by the contractor prior to the default.